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Primaquine is an anti-malarial drug. When someone infected with the falciparum 
malaria parasite takes the drug, it reduces the risk that the parasite will be transmitted 
to mosquitoes and so to other people. However, it confers no direct benefit on the 
individual who takes the drug. Indeed it poses a net risk, since it has side effects and 
can cause a breakdown of red blood cells in certain genetically susceptible 
individuals. Nevertheless, primaquine is taken as a single dose by millions of people 
annually. 
Triptorelin is a testosterone-suppressing drug that has been used to ‘chemically 
castrate’ sex offenders, including paedophiles. It can’t redirect misplaced sexual 
desires, but it can attenuate them, and there is some evidence that this can reduce the 
risk of recidivism in a subgroup of offenders. Again, though, it can have serious side 
effects for the user, including depression and softening of the bones. 
Both of these drugs, then, can work in ways that benefit third parties, but confer 
no net benefit on the user of the drug.1 This has led some to question whether it is 
ethical to prescribe them, even when the user freely consents to their use.2 For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
example, Kevin Baird and Claudia Surjadjaja have argued that prescribing single-dose 
primaquine for third party benefit may be ethical in some cases, but only when the 
risks to the patient fall within certain limits. Measured risks can be taken, but 
significant risks of serious harm cannot.3 
The concern here is not that primaquine and triptorelin are being used in part for 
their benefits to third parties. This is the case with many medical interventions, as 
when an AIDS patient uses anti-retroviral therapy in part to reduce the risk of 
infecting others. This seems unproblematic. Rather the worry is that, in some cases at 
least, the use of primaquine and triptorelin may have no benefit for the user and 
indeed may pose a risk of serious harm. It may thus violate the requirement that 
seriously risky medical interventions should not be provided solely to bring about 
benefits to the third parties, even when their use is voluntary. They should be 
provided only when they’re in the best interests of the individual who undergoes the 
intervention. 
Let us call this the ‘best interests requirement’. 
The best interests requirement is widely accepted, at least as a rough rule of 
thumb, both by medical ethicists and medical practitioners (though some might allow 
an exception for cases in which the third parties are friends or family, as, for example, 
in cases of sibling-sibling organ donation). But I find it puzzling. It’s generally 
regarded as ethically acceptable for a person to undergo a risky procedure to benefit 
herself. And surely it’s more admirable to take a risky drug to benefit others. So why 
adopt a principle that rules out altruistic treatments while allowing self-interested 
ones? In many other contexts individuals are encouraged to expose themselves to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
physical and mental risks for the social good; consider allied efforts to recruit soldiers 
to fight Nazism during World War II. 
Perhaps some think that the best interests requirement is necessary to prevent the 
misuse of medical technologies. We should accept the requirement since, if we do 
not, we are likely to subsequently accept seriously immoral uses of medicine to 
benefit society. Although the consensual provision of risky but socially beneficial 
medical interventions might be ethically acceptable taken in isolation, we have no 
way of enabling this without also creating a risk of more extreme, ethically 
objectionable practices. So we should adopt a moral requirement that rules out all 
seriously risky interventions that are not in the interests of the user. 
This rationale looks superficially persuasive. Humanity does have a bad track 
record of coercively and misguidedly adopting intrusive and risky medical 
interventions perceived to have social benefits: think of the past use of frontal 
lobotomy to control putatively anti-social behaviour and of coercive sterilization to 
achieve the social benefit of better genes for future generations. 
However, it’s at least open to question whether concerns about past misuse are 
sufficiently powerful to justify forgoing the social benefits of interventions like 
single-dose primaquine and triptorelin-induced chemical castration. 
In the wake of diabolical attempts to achieve social goals through medicine in the 
twentieth century, it may have been reasonable to introduce a strict best interests 
requirement. But we have since made a good deal of progress in medical ethics; the 
risk of serious misuse is much lower than before, at least in countries that witnessed a 
‘medical ethics revolution’ in the late twentieth century . And we’ve acquired greater 
technological capacity to achieve genuine social benefits through medicine. It’s now 
time to rethink the requirement. 
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